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Abstract: This study analyzes results from an original survey of members of the French and 
German parliaments (Assemblée Nationale, Sénat and Bundestag) on economic policies and 
institutions of the Eurozone. We find that French politicians are significantly more supportive 
of Eurobonds, a European unemployment insurance scheme, and an active monetary policy 
by the ECB than German politicians. At the same time, there are significant differences along 
party lines, which are often quantitatively more important than differences in nationality. Left-
leaning members of parliaments are in favor of new policy instruments at the European or 
Eurozone level, but are skeptical about the fiscal constraints of the Fiscal Compact. There is 
widespread consensus across parties and countries that more investment at national levels is 
warranted.  
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1. Introduction 
Since 2010 the euro area debt crisis has confirmed that the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
was created with an incomplete institutional design (Lane, 2012; O'Rourke and Taylor, 2013). 
The loss of an adjustable nominal exchange rate occurred without a sufficient match by more 
effective alternative adjustment instruments. From the beginning, the Maastricht Treaty’s “no 
bailout clause” has raised issues of credibility, given the absence of an orderly procedure to 
deal with the case of sovereign insolvency (Fuest et al., 2016; Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). At the 
same time, the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact have proved largely ineffective 
(Ioannou and Stracca, 2014). Moreover, the absence of a well-defined lender of last resort has 
given rise to risks of multiple equilibria with destructive contagion in the government bond 
markets (De Grauwe, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Lorenzoni and Werning, 2013). The threat 
of destructive and self-enforcing vicious circles has been further increased by the continuing 
national responsibility for the supervision of large banks and the mutual financial dependence 
of national banking sectors and governments (Moro, 2014).   
The dramatic years of crisis have yielded substantial learning effects. The verdict that the EMU 
in its initial set-up resembles a “half-built house” (Bergsten, 2012) has become a far-reaching 
consensus. Several shortcomings of the initial Maastricht constitution have been addressed 
since the outbreak of the acute crisis in the spring of 2010. Fiscal and macroeconomic 
governance rules have been refined (Buti and Carnot, 2012; Hodson, 2013). The rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact have been strengthened. In addition, 25 European Union (EU) 
Member States signed the Fiscal Compact, which obliges signatory countries to establish 
deficit caps within their own national law according to contractual minimum standards (Creel 
et al., 2012). The European Central Bank (ECB) has effectively stepped into the role of a lender 
of last resort through the “Outright Monetary Transaction” (OMT) program (Drudi et al., 
2012). The OMT program allows purchases of crisis countries’ bonds under the condition of 
an agreement with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), whose existence has played a 
key role in the stabilization of the euro area since 2012. A banking union has been set up with 
a European supervision of large banks under the responsibility of the ECB and the 
establishment of a European Banking Resolution Mechanism (Howarth and Quaglia, 2014). 
In spite of this seemingly impressive list of reforms, the political and academic reform debate 
remains intense and the future of the Eurozone unclear (for an academic survey see Dolls et 
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al., 2016; for a political initiative, European Commission, 2017). Using an original survey of 
French and German members of national parliaments (henceforth abbreviated MPs) we 
provide novel insights into the acceptance of existing rules, changes to national policies, and 
the political feasibility of new European-level institutions to preserve and stabilize the 
Eurozone. Our survey relates to diverse reform topics, which cover the set-up of new fiscal 
stabilization instruments for the euro area (e.g. through a European unemployment 
insurance) or possible new financing instruments for euro area governments. There is an 
ongoing debate about the extent to which national autonomy should be limited through 
constitutional reforms with more EU competences or the introduction of an “EU Finance 
Minister” (European Commission, 2017), who could give binding orders for issues like tax 
policies or structural reforms. Moreover, the important role taken by the ECB as a lender of 
last resort for illiquid governments remains highly controversial. 
Any further reform of the euro area setup, however, must respect the unanimity constraint of 
EU treaty changes. Reforms are only feasible if they are acceptable for all Member States. This 
holds in particular with the acute crisis pressure receding. European heterogeneity of reform 
preferences may result not only from different economic or political interests but also from 
different values and beliefs summarized as “culture”. Cultural heterogeneity is increasingly 
regarded as highly relevant for the feasibility of further integration steps in Europe in general 
and for the EMU in particular. Alesina et al. (2017) show that the heterogeneity of general 
norms (including the value of hard work or obedience) between Northern and Southern 
Europe has increased in the European Union over the last decades despite more economic 
integration. Guiso et al. (2016) argue that the Greek crisis has been aggravated by cultural 
clashes. Viewed from this angle, politicians are unable to agree on optimal crisis management 
because decisions may run against deeply rooted norms and beliefs of their voters. If, for 
example, German voters strongly adhere to values of control, punishment and obedience, a 
German government may find it difficult to agree to a generous financing of a crisis country 
which has not respected European rules. This may even hold if a more generous approach – 
by preventing crisis contagion – would be beneficial for Germany itself. 
In their analysis of the euro crisis and the underlying national policy traditions, Brunnermeier 
et al. (2016) focus on Germany and France. They diagnose a “Rhine-Divide” according to which 
policy approaches between Paris and Berlin differ substantially: Compared to France, German 
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economic policy stresses the importance of rules over discretion and principles of liability over 
solidarity. Liquidity constraints tend to be seen as an outcome of fundamental insolvency in 
Germany, whereas in France they are often viewed as part of self-enforcing bad equilibria. 
Consistent with these assessments, French policy prescriptions are more Keynesian and 
demand-oriented whereas German approaches emphasize the need of austerity and 
structural reforms in order to deal with such crises. 
Our contribution follows those authors who view different economic policy traditions as a 
constraint on EMU reforms. Following Brunnermeier et al. (2016) we analyze EMU-related 
reform preferences with a particular focus on the possible French-German divide. Our study 
is unique insofar as it is based on the first comparative survey of euro reform preferences in 
national parliaments in the euro area: France (covering both chambers, the Assemblée 
Nationale and the Sénat) and Germany (Deutscher Bundestag2). Over the history of European 
integration, France and Germany have played a pivotal role for new integration initiatives 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2016). A political consensus of the two largest euro area economies 
appears to be a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for the viability of any EMU 
reform options.  
While recent euro area reform decisions such as the ESM or the Fiscal Compact have been 
initiated by the Council, they are constrained by the consent of national parliaments according 
to national rules. According to Maatsch (2015), the power of parliaments relative to their 
governments has been effectively cut back during the crisis, for example through fast-track 
procedures suppressing extensive parliamentary debates or merger of different complex 
decisions into a single package. The author shows that this curtailment of parliamentary 
control rights occurred mainly in Southern Europe. However, the influence of the Bundestag 
through its veto power has even been fostered, mainly due to rulings by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court.  
We conducted the survey in spring 2016, addressing the German Bundestag and the two 
French parliamentary chambers at the national level. Our questions cover two fields. The 
questions on national growth policies include both demand and supply side issues: an increase 
                                                          
2 An inclusion of the first chamber in Germany, the Bundesrat, appears less interesting given that it only consists 
of representatives from state governments (the so-called Länder), which makes it not comparable to the larger 
number of individual parliamentarians in the French Sénat. 
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in national investment in different domains and more flexible labor markets. The EMU-related 
questions cover institutions, policies and reform options for the euro area comprising an 
assessment of the ECB involvement, the debate on voting rules on tax issues in the EU, the 
Fiscal Compact, a possible European unemployment insurance scheme, and the 
collectivization of debt through Eurobonds. 
A key question is to which extent the German-French heterogeneity is driven by genuine 
German-French differences or whether it largely reflects different party ideologies. The latter 
creates polarization of views, which are familiar from within-country debates. Our results 
draw a differentiated picture. We show a distinct “Rhine Divide” beyond the usual party 
polarization for some of the euro-related topics like Eurobonds, the Fiscal Compact and the 
strong ECB involvement: For these issues, French and German parliamentarians have strongly 
contrasting views even within one party family. Intra-party differences are less pronounced 
for national economic policies such as labor market deregulation or investment spending.  
Our paper complements Blesse et al. (forthcoming) in which we have analyzed four questions 
from the same survey that relate exclusively to labor market issues. Two of these four 
questions (labor market flexibility, European unemployment insurance) are taken up also in 
the present paper and are combined with five questions not covered in the companion paper. 
In contrast to the companion paper we focus in this study on preferences of national MPs on 
fiscal and economic policy and reform issues in the Euro area..  
In the next section, we describe the institutional setting and survey details. After a descriptive 
look at both the country and party dimension of MP preferences in Germany and France in 
section 3 we provide a thorough econometric testing as well as a series of robustness checks 
in sections 4 and 5, taking into account individual heterogeneity among of respondents. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Survey description 
2.1 Institutional setup and survey details 
The national legislative chambers in Germany and France differ in various aspects. The 
German Bundestag has a mixed-member proportional voting system where 299 members of 
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parliament are directly elected (first vote) and 299 are indirectly elected from party lists 
(second vote).3 Note that the German MPs in our survey were elected in late 2013 for four 
years in office.  
The legislative branch in France is divided into two chambers: the Assemblée Nationale and 
the Sénat as the lower and the upper house, respectively. Whereas MPs in the Assemblée 
Nationale are elected by majority decisions in up to two rounds for 5 years (starting in our 
sample in 2012 for the legislative term ending in 2017), members of the Sénat are indirectly 
elected by elected officials of various tiers of government including the Assemblée. Half of the 
senators are elected every three years for a six-year term, the last election preceding our 
survey being September 2014.  
National parliaments in Germany and France differ somewhat by the degree of involvement 
in controversial legislation, for example during the euro crisis. Whereas the German 
government had major policy measures approved by the Bundestag, France relied, as in other 
cases of controversial legislation, on a strong executive. The French government used 
constitutional powers and issued decree laws. Eventually the French executive did involve its 
national MPs in the decision on rescue policies during the Euro crisis, such as the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), ESM and the Fiscal compact. However, it did so by using a 
fast-track procedure which limited the parliamentary debates to one.4   
Our survey of the French and German parliaments is a result of a collaboration of researchers 
from ZEW Mannheim and the University of Mannheim, both located in Germany, as well as 
the École Polytechnique in Palaiseau, France. The survey is the first comparative survey of 
national representatives about their attitudes on EMU institutions and policy reform 
preferences.  
The questionnaires for the French and German MPs were formulated in French and German, 
respectively, but had the same content and wording. The survey contained a cover letter and 
a three-page survey, and was sent out in late April 2016 from Palaiseau for the French 
parliament, and from Mannheim for the Bundestag. The initial contact was through regular 
                                                          
3 The German electoral system allows for additional parliamentary seats (excess mandates) when number of 
second vote seats exceeds number of first vote seats. In the 2013-17 legislative period the total number of seats 
was 630. 
4 Some authors view the limited involvement of the French parliament as problematic, as it undermines 
democratic legitimacy; see Brunnermeier et al. (2016 pp. 45-46) and Maatsch (2015).  
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mail to the main office of the members of parliament. Politicians could respond either by mail, 
email, fax, or via a customized online-survey tool. In case of no response, reminder emails 
were sent after a month (unless somebody explicitly declined to participate). As a final 
attempt to obtain an answer, MPs were contacted by phone. Completed surveys were 
received between late April and mid-July 2016.  
The survey was not anonymized in order to analyze the determinants of participation as well 
as the elicited beliefs of the MPs about EMU policy reforms. The confidentiality of the 
individual answers was guaranteed, however, in order to encourage unbiased reporting of 
preferences. Individual characteristics of MPs, such as party membership, country of origin, as 
well as age, gender, education or length of parliament membership, were self-collected. We 
randomized the ordering of questions in each question bloc of the questionnaire in order to 
avoid biased response behavior due to possible order effects. 
In total, we received 232 completed questionnaires from the overall population of 1,552 
national MPs in Germany and France (response rate of 14.95%). German MPs were slightly 
more responsive than their French counterparts, with response rates of 16.03% and 14.21%, 
respectively. The response rates compare reasonably well to other surveys, while being 
somewhat lower than previous surveys of the Bundestag (Heinemann and Janeba, 2011; Heß 
et al., 2013), but slightly higher for French MPs (Deschouwer and Depauw, 2014). 
Table 1 gives an overview of the participation rates across country of origin. We also report 
participation rates across an ideological dimension. For this purpose we classify the MPs 
according to the political grouping in the European parliament. In Germany there is a clear 
correspondence between an individual party and a parliamentary group. By contrast, the 
French bicameral system lacks such congruence. MPs from political parties self-select in 
various ways into existing blocs or parliamentary groups in both houses. Table A1.1 in the 
Online-Appendix documents the relation between parties on the one hand and national and 
European parliamentary groups on the other hand. In what follows, we use the respective 
fraction membership in the European Parliament (EP) as the measure of the left-right position. 
Our baseline estimates consider MPs from the fractions of both Socialists and Democrats 
(S&D), Greens (Greens/EFA) as well as European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) as 
left-leaning MPs, which we compare to the conservatives of the European People's Party 
group (EPP), the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) and the Liberals (ALDE). Conservatives 
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have a lower participation rate than left-wing MPs with 12.9 compared to 16.0%, respectively. 
5  
In Blesse et al. (forthcoming) we have conducted a non-response analysis on the basis of a 
simple probit model in order to predict survey participation. The analysis confirms higher 
response rates of German and S&D (or more generally left-wing party) members, and shows 
the importance of several individual characteristics. For instance, age is positively related to 
participation, while number of years in parliament has the opposite effect. Several 
characteristics such as education (upper secondary, university degree or type of degree of 
study) do not matter. Committee membership is partially relevant for survey participation: 
Finance committee members tend to be more inclined to answer to our questionnaire. In 
order to deal with issues of sample selection we always include all MP characteristics in our 
econometric analysis below.  
  
                                                          
5 In recent years right-wing populist parties have enjoyed a growing vote share across several Western 
democracies. In our data set, there are not a sufficient number of observations to analyze right-wing populist 
views on EMU policies. The German Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) was not present in the Bundestag at the 
time of the survey and the Front National held only a few seats in the Assemblée.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of MPs: response vs. non-response 
 
Response No response Total 
Country 
France 131 791 922 
Germany 101 529 630 
    
Party membership by EP fraction 
European People's Party Group (EPP) 88 562 650 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 110 506 616 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 9 63 72 
European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 12 86 98 
Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) 12 78 90 
Others 1 25 26 
    
National parliament group  (GER/FRA) 
Greens (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN)a 9 54 63 
Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU)a 41 269 310 
The Left (DIE LINKE)a 12 52 64 
Social-Democrats (SPD)a 39 154 193 
    
    
The Republicans (LR)b 47 292 339 
Socialist Party (PS)b 67 330 397 
Other French MPsb 17 169 186 
Note: Country of origin indicated by a - Germany; b - France. To ensure confidentiality we show only the 
respective response results from single parliamentary groups if at least 3 party members answered the survey. 
“Others” in the panel party membership by EP groups includes individual MPs with no EP group affiliation and 
the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF). The group of “Other French MPs” includes MPs with no group 
affiliation, members of the European Democratic and Social Rally group (RDSE), the Communist Party (PCF), 
Radical, Republicain, Democratic and Progressist, (RRDP), the Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), the 
French Greens (Écologistes) as well as the Democratic and Republican Left Group.  
 
2.2 Questionnaire 
Our survey covers important topics of the EMU reform debate. We address both the national 
dimension - policies that may improve the working of a common currency through higher 
economic growth and more economic convergence - and the European dimension, relating to 
(reforms of) EMU policies and institutions directly. 
National growth policies 
The following two questions are often discussed in the context of growth promotion at the 
national level. 
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Question 1 (Q1): Flexible labor markets 
For higher economic growth of the EMU it is essential that especially countries with 
permanently high levels of unemployment make their labor markets more flexible (e.g. via an 
easing of dismissal protection regulations or a decrease of the statutory minimum wage).  
Disagree             Undecided                Agree 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
Question 2 (Q2): Higher investment 
For higher economic growth of the EMU it is essential that its member states increase their 
investment expenditures. 
Disagree             Undecided                Agree 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
The wording of all questions reflects the requirement that respondents unfamiliar with 
economic terminology should be able to grasp the main issue at stake. For that purpose, we 
have chosen “flexible labor markets” as a typical supply-side prescription. We have clarified 
the term more flexible labor markets through examples of dismissal protection and minimum 
wages. Thus, the answer to Question 1 approximates the extent to which a respondent’s 
economic thinking is aligned with a supply-side view in the context of labor markets. Question 
2 refers to investment, which has a supply-side dimension as well because better public 
infrastructure makes firms more productive (e.g. Haughwout, 2002). More recently, higher 
public investment has often been strongly supported by left-of-center politicians and 
economists, as part of a demand-side policy. In this sense, Question 2 is less clearly identified 
as a supply side policy as compared to content and wording of Question 1. 
 
EMU institutions and policies 
The first question of the EMU-related survey part covers the role of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) during the crisis. Question 3 asks for an evaluation of a crucial aspect of ECB 
involvement: the central bank’s interventions in the market for euro area government bonds.6  
 
                                                          
6 In order to avoid the wording being too complex, we dropped the distinction between different bond 
purchasing programs. Since 2010, the following different programs have come into existence: the Securities 
Market Program of 2010, the OMT program (set up in 2012 but never activated), and the quantitative easing 
(QE) programs since 2015. 
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Question 3 (Q3): Asset purchase program of ECB 
 
The European Central Bank has taken a strongly active position in recent years by purchasing 
sovereign bonds of euro countries. This strongly active position of the ECB should continue. 
Disagree             Undecided                Agree 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
 
One recurring topic in the EMU reform debate is a possible restriction of national fiscal 
autonomy and transfer of power to the level of the Eurozone. The European Commission’s 
recent reflection paper on the deepening of the European Union via a European Treasury and 
a European Finance Minister (European Commission, 2017) underlines the relevance of the 
debate. Questions 4 and 5 cover two different aspects of fiscal autonomy: deficit limits and 
voting in the European Council on taxes.  
Question 4 asks about the desirability of the Fiscal Compact (as part of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the EMU), which imposes a limit on each country’s general 
government structural deficit since 2013. Question 5, by contrast, relates to the decision rule 
at the EU level on tax matters. Under the status quo, any tax legislation at the EU level must 
pass with unanimity, which has been reached for certain aspects in the area of indirect 
taxation (e.g., full harmonization of the value added tax base and minimum threshold for the 
value added tax rate). For direct taxation, neither tax rates nor tax bases are currently 
harmonized (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2014). Question 5 asks about an end to national veto power 
in EU tax legislation matters by moving from unanimity to majority voting (see also 
Wasserfallen, 2014). We use corporate tax caps and floors as possible areas of application for 
majority voting. The balanced framing (“caps” and “floors”) reduces the risk that individual 
preferences on the level of taxes drive the results.   
 
  
12 
 
Question 4 (Q4): Fiscal Compact 
The Fiscal Compact that was signed by 25 EU member states in 2012 commits the contracting 
parties like France and Germany to limit the general government deficit (cyclically adjusted) at 
0.5 % of Gross Domestic Product. 
Do you think it is desirable that [Germany/France] complies with the obligations of the Fiscal 
Compact? 
Non desirable                       Undecided               Desirable 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
Question 5 (Q5): Tax policy 
The European council should be able to vote on taxes with a qualified majority (e.g. binding 
caps or floors for corporate taxes).  
Disagree             Undecided                Agree 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
 
Question 6 addresses an issue in the area of fiscal policy as well, but shifts attention to a new 
fiscal instrument: a fiscal capacity for the euro area through a European unemployment 
insurance (EUI). Variants of EUI have been discussed widely in the literature (Andor, 2014; 
Dullien, 2014; Dolls et al., 2015). A common feature of all variants under consideration is that 
at least a part of unemployment benefits is (directly or indirectly) financed from a common 
European pool of resources. The purpose of a common insurance scheme is to stabilize euro 
economies hit by an asymmetric shock. We refer to EUI in our question because it appears 
less abstract compared to other type of stabilization capacities such as stabilization funds or 
contingent reinsurance mechanisms (see Dolls et al., 2015 for details).  
 
 
Question 6 (Q6): European unemployment insurance 
A common European unemployment insurance should be introduced to absorb recessions in 
individual member states of the EMU. 
Disagree             Undecided                Agree 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
 
Finally, Question 7 addresses the role of a new joint financing instrument in the form of 
Eurobonds. Again, we use simple wording to illustrate the idea. Eurobonds with joint liability 
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of euro members are a far reaching financial innovation compared to other instruments (such 
as the “blue/red bond” proposal by Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010; or the “European Safe 
Bonds” by Brunnermeier et al., 2016), which appear to be less known in the general public.  
 
Question 7 (Q7): Eurobonds 
All euro countries are jointly liable for Eurobonds and all euro countries pay the same interest. 
The EMU should issue Eurobonds. 
Disagree             Undecided                Agree 
  -4   -3   -2   -1   0   +1   +2   +3   +4 
 
 
3. Descriptive analysis 
A main objective of our study is to find out to what extent national differences between France 
and Germany matter in the debate on the future of EMU (i.e., the “cultural” Rhine divide). 
Alternatively, differences in policymakers’ views in France and Germany could be rooted in 
differences in ideology, or simply be the result of certain individual characteristics like age or 
gender. We focus in particular on the need to disentangle the influences from nationality and 
ideology/party membership. The former would constitute a long-run obstacle to a German-
French consensus, while the latter can change with elections.  
We begin with a descriptive analysis and present the distribution of responses along the two 
dimensions of interest across policy fields. Throughout sections 3 and 4 we focus on members 
of national parliaments who belong to either the left-of-center or the right-of-center 
parliamentary groups of the European Parliament to facilitate cross-country comparisons.7  
 
National growth policies  
Figures 1 and 2 show the heterogeneity of responses to questions regarding national growth 
policies by nationality and party ideology, respectively. The issue of labor market flexibility to 
enhance growth polarizes respondents along party groups but not much along the country 
dimension. Conservative MPs in both countries tend to support higher flexibility of national 
                                                          
7 In section 5 we check the robustness of our findings by focusing only on MPs from the social-democrats (S&D) 
and the Christian-democrats (EPP) groups as the relevant units of comparison. 
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labor markets, while the opposite is true for social-democratic politicians. The main national 
difference is that French parliamentarians show slightly more support for extreme views 
(higher frequency of strong support (+4) or strong rejection (-4) than German politicians. 
Higher investment spending is favored by overwhelming majorities in both countries but 
German politicians and conservative party members are somewhat less enthusiastic. 
 
Figure 1: National growth policy priorities – national cleavage 
 
 
Figure 2: National growth policy priorities – partisan cleavage 
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EMU institutions and policies 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the distribution of policy preferences of MPs across the five 
remaining questions about EMU institutions and reform initiatives along nationality and 
political ideology of European Parliament party groups. 
Figure 3: EMU policy and reform priorities – national cleavage 
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Figure 4: EMU policy and reform priorities – partisan cleavages
 
 
The strong involvement of the ECB during the euro area debt crisis splits MPs into opposite 
camps along both the country and the party dimension. French and socialist/social-democratic 
members of parliament are by and large supportive of the central bank’s purchases of 
sovereign bonds. By contrast, more than half of German and of conservative MPs have a 
critical view on the role of the ECB. 
A reduction of national autonomy in fiscal policy matters receives mixed support with 
discernable differences at the country and party level. German MPs strongly support deficit 
constraints as defined by the Fiscal Compact. The Compact has majority support in the French 
parliaments as well, but the support is weaker than in the Bundestag. By contrast, the views 
on European decisions rules on tax matters are again clearly polarized. A majority of French 
respondents welcomes a less restrictive decision rule in the EU regarding tax issues, whereas 
German representatives are split on that issue. The reform is popular among politicians from 
the left but less so among the right. Conservatives are fervent advocates of fiscal rules, 
whereas politicians on the left are much less united in their support.  
The approval rates for a European fiscal capacity in the form of an unemployment insurance 
scheme are mixed, both from a country and a party perspective. A strong “no” (-4) to EUI is 
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the most frequent answer given both by German and conservative politicians. A majority of 
left-leaning politicians support the introduction of a stabilization tool. In France opponents 
and supporters of EUI roughly balance out.  
The issue of Eurobonds, the most far reaching option for mutual debt guarantees in the euro 
area, is the question associated with the strongest polarization along both country and party 
group dimensions. There is strong support from French members of parliament, as well as 
from a majority of left-leaning politicians in both countries. For German and conservative 
survey participants alike, Eurobonds are highly unpopular: a strong “no” (-4) is by far the most 
frequent response in our sample. 
On top of the graphical evidence we examine statistical tests of group mean differences across 
MPs policy preferences. Table 2 displays the results of simple two-independent group t-tests, 
i.e. the average response scores to both national and EMU policy preferences along ideology 
and nationality. The tests show that most comparisons yield statistically significant group 
differences at conventional levels. Only country differences in preferences for flexible labor 
markets and the support for the fiscal compact do not translate into significant differences in 
group averages at the 10 percent level. Results are widely confirmed with non-parametric 
tests such as Wilcoxon-rank sum tests or Chi-square tests in Online-Appendix B. Wilcoxon-
rank sum tests represents the non-parametric analog of the independent t-test if one thinks 
that normality assumption of the interval variable of the Likert scale is bound to fail and the 
Chi-square test measures the statistical relationship between the response frequencies per 
category across groups. 
Overall, the descriptive evidence provides some support for the “Rhine divide”-hypothesis: 
Compared to their French colleagues, German members of the Bundestag are indeed more 
skeptical when it comes to a strong role for monetary policy in crisis stabilization, a new 
stabilization instrument (EUI), and a common public debt management (Eurobonds). Both new 
policy instruments receive more support in the French parliamentary chambers. However, no 
strong national cleavage can be detected for an important supply side issue like more labor 
market flexibility, for which only the partisan cleavage appears to be very strong. Moreover, 
we find substantial partisan differences across all policy fields surveyed in this study. 
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Table 2: Average responses on national and EMU policy preferences by ideology and country 
       
  Ideology   Country  
 Left Right t-test 
(p-
values) 
Germany France t-test 
(p-
values) 
       
National       
Flexible labor market -1.795 2.117 0.000  -0.364  0.000 0.346 
Higher investments  2.901 1.989 0.000   2.242  2.732 0.014 
       
EMU       
ECB asset purchase   1.718 -0.404 0.000 -0.010  1.480 0.000 
Fiscal compact  0.361  3.152 0.000  1.853  1.325 0.118 
Tax policy   1.462 -0.165 0.000  0.240  1.141 0.020 
EUI   0.955 -1.681 0.000 -0.737  0.289 0.005 
Eurobonds   2.092 -1.234 0.000 -0.381  1.508 0.000 
 
4. Econometric analysis 
In this section we undertake a more systematic analysis of the comparative survey of national 
MP preferences. The econometric testing explores the relative importance of nationality and 
ideology for policy preferences for matters of national growth and EMU policy and 
institutional design. 
4.1. Model and variables 
The non-anonymous survey allows us to take into account individual characteristics of MPs, in 
addition to the two dimensions nationality and party group. We cover individual 
characteristics such as gender and age, parliamentary experience (number of years as a 
member of parliament), education (upper secondary education: “baccalauréat”/”Abitur” and 
tertiary education: university degree), and expertise in economic and financial matters 
through membership in certain committees (finance or EU affairs).8  
We are agnostic about the expected signs of the individual characteristics. Including the 
variables, however, serves to limit selection bias, since some of these characteristics 
determine individual response probability (see section 2.1.) and are related to policy 
preferences of MPs. Their inclusion therefore reduces the danger of omitted variable bias. 
                                                          
8 See Table A1.2 of the Online-Appendix for Summary statistics of individual control variables. 
19 
 
For our baseline model we use an ordered probit estimation with policy preferences for 
national or EMU policies across the -4 (disagree, undesirable) to +4 (agree, desirable) scale as 
dependent variables. However, we only report the effects of strong policy support, e.g. + 4 
response categories, and discuss the symmetry of effects across all response categories in the 
main text. Results across categories are reported in the Online Appendix. In line with our 
research question we are mainly interested in the effects of the country and political group 
dummies on policy preferences. For political ideology, the baseline builds on the dichotomy 
of left-leaning versus conservative party affiliation in the European parliament. Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D), Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) as well as European United 
Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) are defined as left-leaning MPs whereas which national 
MPs belonging to the group of Christian-democrats (EPP), Europe of Nations and Freedom 
(ENF) and Liberals (ALDE) are coded as conservatives. As mentioned above, we explore the 
effects of alternative measures for ideological differences among MPs in section 5 below.  
4.2. Results 
For the sake of brevity this section illustrates the average marginal effects of our variables of 
interest on strong policy support, i.e. the effect of nationality, ideology and individual factors 
on the likelihood of eliciting +4 responses for the respective question. Note that the Online-
Appendix A2 reports the full baseline regression results for each individual answer category. 
We check the robustness of our results in Section 5 by collapsing all answer categories to a 
survey question into a binary variable i.e. that is we estimate the likelihood of policy support 
in a broader sense. 
Table 3 shows the results for preferences on national growth enhancing policies and illustrates 
the average marginal effects for the top response category +4. Columns 1 and 2 report the 
results for MP preferences on flexible labor markets and more national investments, 
respectively. The results confirm a strong role of party affiliation for preferences on national 
growth policies. Ceteris paribus, a MP from the left has a 29.8 percentage point lower 
probability to strongly opt for more flexible labor markets than his or her conservative peer. 
For the demand side policy “higher national investments” the ideological divide is slightly less 
pronounced with a 23.4 percentage point higher probability of support from the left. 
Regarding the symmetry of policy support, it appears that left-leaning MPs have a significantly 
higher probability to disagree with flexible labor markets (Table A2.1). The positive average 
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marginal effects of left MPs is significantly negative across all negative answer categories and 
turns into significant positive coefficients for supporting answer categories (+2 to +4). Point 
estimates also increase symmetrically with the more negative or the more positive answer 
categories are.  Results seem to be less robust for national investment strategies as only very 
supportive attitudes are positively related to left-leaning ideology (Table A2.2). More negative 
answer categories have negative signs in their estimated average marginal effects. 
Nationality is much less important as a determinant of preferences. No response category 
shows statistical significance at conventional levels for nationality of MPs either for the flexible 
labor markets or higher national investments statements (for the full results on each response 
category, see the Online-Appendix A2.1 and A2.2). Also the marginal effect is much smaller 
than for party ideology. Individual characteristics of MPs, however, play almost no significant 
role in the determination of national policy preferences. 
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Table 3: National growth policy priorities, average marginal effect for (+4), baseline 
 
Flexible labor markets Higher investments    
   
France 0.00610 0.0761  
(0.24) (1.55)    
Left -0.298*** 0.234***  
(-6.62) (5.00)    
Female -0.00360 -0.106**  
(-0.12) (-2.01)    
Age 0.000239 0.00392  
(0.18) (1.48)    
Years as MP 0.00129 -0.00199  
(0.72) (-0.58)    
Upper secondary -0.104 0.00105  
(-1.27) (0.01)    
University degree 0.0929** 0.0219  
(2.22) (0.22)    
Economics committee -0.00387 -0.0638  
(-0.08) (-0.78)    
Finance committee 0.0526 0.147*  
(1.37) (1.89)    
EU affairs committee 0.120** 0.0448  
(2.29) (0.55) 
   
N 214 213 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis  
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for national policies). 
 
 
We now turn to policies at the European and Eurozone level. The role of differing national 
views – also within the same European party family – is more pronounced here. This is 
illustrated for attitudes of strong policy support in Table 4. Party affiliation plays a major role 
in explaining the heterogeneity in policy preferences. For instance, left MPs are more 
supportive of ECB interventions than conservatives. On limiting national autonomy, the 
effects of ideology are strongly asymmetric: relative to the political right, the left favors 
majority voting on tax issues at the European level and is heavily opposed to fiscal constraints 
with left-leaning politicians being 49.2 percentage points less likely to be strongly in favor to 
the Fiscal Compact. Far reaching stabilization (EUI) and mutual guarantees (Eurobonds) within 
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Europe are particularly popular among the left MPs in both countries. Again, ideology effects 
are widely symmetric across all respective answer categories (Table A.2.3 to A.2.7). 
The results indicate a statistically distinct impact of nationality in all policy areas, which exists 
independent of the significant ideological cleavage. When both factors are significant, the sign 
of the nationality effect is identical to the left-right effect. Compared to German politicians, 
the French respondents are more supportive of asset purchases by the ECB, debt 
mutualization through Eurobonds, and stabilization through a European unemployment 
insurance scheme even if they belong to the same party family as German representatives. 
Conversely, French politicians are more skeptical about fiscal constraints as implemented in 
the Fiscal Compact. French MPs are, however, more supportive for the introduction of a 
system of majority voting on tax issues at the European level. The sizes of the average marginal 
effects from nationality are on average smaller than those of ideology, but French 
policymakers have 18.6 percentage points’ higher probabilities of strongly supporting 
Eurobonds or rejecting the Fiscal Compact, respectively. The effect of nationality on policy 
support usually has a lower point estimate across all EMU topics by about one third or even 
only at about 20 percent of the average marginal effect of the left ideology dummy variable. 
Again, individual MP factors are not consistently significant determinants of preferences.  
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Table 4: EMU institutions and policies, average marginal effect for (+4), baseline 
 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax policy EUI Eurobonds 
      
France 0.127*** -0.106*** 0.0882** 0.0769**
* 
0.186*** 
 (4.62) (-2.60) (2.09) (3.02) (6.03) 
 
     
Left  0.182*** -0.492*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.262*** 
 (5.96) (-9.47) (4.23) (5.28) (7.63) 
 
     
Female -0.0646** 0.0291 -0.0579 -0.0264 -0.0831*** 
 (-2.46) (0.60) (-1.24) (-0.95) (-2.72) 
      
Age 0.000220 0.00212 0.00257 0.00182 -0.00142 
 (0.16) (0.99) (1.15) (1.33) (-0.91) 
 
     
Years as MP -0.00176 -0.00212 -0.00277 -0.00106 -0.00325 
 (-0.98) (-0.77) (-0.93) (-0.60) (-1.59) 
 
     
Upper secondary 0.0359 0.0546 -0.0803 -0.0116 0.114** 
 (0.67) (0.57) (-0.66) (-0.17) (2.46) 
 
     
University degree 0.00628 -0.0192 0.141** 0.00319 -0.127* 
 (0.12) (-0.21) (2.01) (0.06) (-1.73) 
 
     
Economics committee 0.0456 0.0870 0.0259 -0.0643** 0.00243 
 (0.80) (1.06) (0.31) (-2.14) (0.04) 
 
     
Finance committee -0.00865 0.0804 0.122* 0.0143 0.0295 
 (-0.26) (1.35) (1.76) (0.40) (0.70) 
 
     
EU affairs committee -0.0111 0.0792 0.147* -0.0548* -0.0670* 
 (-0.29) (1.10) (1.81) (-1.91) (-1.84) 
      
N 213 202 215 214 212 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p< 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis   
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for EMU policies). 
 
 
To summarize, in line with our descriptive results we find strong support for the role of party 
and country influences. French policymakers and those from left-wing parties are significantly 
more in favor of existing and new Eurozone competencies such as Eurobonds, a European 
unemployment insurance scheme, and the ECB’s asset purchase program, as well as in favor 
of more investment at the national level. On more flexible labor markets and higher 
investments at the national level, only the party position is significant, but not the nationality 
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of the members of parliament. In quantitative terms the party effect dominates the nationality 
effect substantially. Individual characteristics tend to play only a very small role. 
5. Robustness and extensions 
In the following we apply several sensitivity tests to investigate the validity of our findings on 
strong and independent effects of party ideology as well as cross-border differences in policy 
preferences.  In particular, we consider the following robustness checks.  
 First, we check whether the effects of French nationality are driven by either of the two 
chambers in France.  
 Second, we take a different view on our ideology variable by restricting our sample on left 
(S&D) versus conservatives (EPP) in the European Parliament. Hence, we lose observations 
by cutting other parties from our sample but we yield an intuitive comparison for the left-
right comparison of party ideology across country borders.  
 Third, we implement a continuous measure of general party ideology from the left-right 
scale based on national party membership of MPs. We use the well-known Chapel Hill 
Expert Surveys (Polk et al., 2017) for both German and French parties. The left-right scale 
from this source is based on an interval ranging from 0 (extreme left) and 5 (center party) 
to 10 (extreme right) of the one-dimensional political spectrum.  
 Fourth, we investigate whether members of incumbent parties have different policy 
preferences than the respective opposition parties, perhaps because the incumbent 
government passed legislation related to our policy issues (such as the introduction of the 
Fiscal Compact).9 We define the incumbent dummy variable as 1 if a politician’s party was 
part of the government coalition in her country in April 2016 (in Germany: Christian 
Democrats CDU/CSU and Social Democrats; France: Parti Socialiste, Parti radical de gauche 
and écologistes) and as zero otherwise. 
 Fifth, we use different econometric methods and replace the ordered probit by an ordered 
logit approach. We also estimate the average marginal effects for a binary outcome 
variable in a probit model. Finally, we investigate whether sample selection via voluntary 
                                                          
9 Strong incumbency effects were found by Heinemann et al. (2016) in a survey among members of German 
state parliaments addressing the issue of compliance with a national fiscal rule. See also Maatsch (2016) for an 
analysis of cleavages based on plenary debates. 
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participation in our survey drives our results by adopting a two-step Heckman procedure 
(Heckman, 1979) and re-estimate the binary probit model. 
In the following tables we abstain from reporting the results for individual characteristics, but 
still control for them to reduce selection into non-response and omitted variable bias.   
Panel (a) in both Tables 5 and 6 provide the baseline estimates from section 4.2. Tables 5 and 
6 show that our results are not driven by a single chamber in France (Panel b). Hence, there is 
no Assemblée Nationale or Sénat position, but rather a French view on national and EMU 
policies. A more precise but less comprehensive definition of the European parliament groups 
to which MPs’ national parties are affiliated does not yield very different results either for the 
ideological variable – neither in magnitude nor in terms of significance (Panel c). The country 
variable effects remain constant except for two policy fields. Whereas we do not find 
significant effects of nationality in the area of tax policy decision making anymore, we do find 
significant positive effects of MP national origin on national investments now. 
When we use a continuous measure of the ideological position, we see qualitatively very 
similar effects (Panel d). Note that the left-right scale proxies left positions with more negative 
and conservative positions with more positive values. Hence, we would expect the signs of the 
ideology variable to take opposite signs compared to the baseline. This is exactly what we find. 
However, the finer classification of parties on the left-right spectrum changes the estimated 
effects of the country dummy. The importance of the country dummy tends to increase under 
the new measure. Nationality of the MP reaches statistical significance at the 5% level in both 
questions relating to national growth policies. The national contrast becomes even stronger 
for the five questions relating to EMU. Here the absolute size of all average marginal effects 
for the estimated country dummy increases. Nationality is statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all EMU policies and reform preference questions. Finally, MPs of incumbent parties 
tend to speak against flexible labor markets (Panel e), but significantly support active 
monetary and fiscal policies at the Eurozone level (ECB asset purchase programs, EUI and 
Eurobonds).  
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Table 5: National growth policies, average marginal effects for (+4), ordered probit model, 
alternative definitions of origin and ideology 
 
Flexible labor markets Higher investment   
 
Panel (a): Baseline results 
 
 
France 0.00610 
(0.24) 
0.0761 
(1.55) 
 
 
  
Left -0.298*** 
(-6.62) 
0.234*** 
(5.00) 
 
N 214 213    
Panel (b): Chamber split France 
Assemblée -0.0141 
(-0.51) 
0.0811 
(1.44) 
 
 
  
Sénat 0.0501 
(1.29) 
0.0713 
(0.99) 
 
 
  
Left -0.290*** 0.233*** 
 (-6.53) (4.94) 
N 214 213    
Panel (c): Alternative definition of EP groups 
France 0.0034 
(0.03) 
0.1060** 
(0.05) 
 
  
 
S&D -0.289*** 
(0.05) 
0.237*** 
(0.05)   
N 182 181 
   
Panel (d): Continuous definition of left-right scale 
France -0.0575** 
(-2.17) 
0.124** 
(2.35) 
   
Left-right scale 0.0756*** 
(7.61) 
-0.0594*** 
(-4.35) 
N 203 202 
Panel (e): Member of incumbent party 
France 0.0484 0.0771  
(-015) (-0.15)    
Incumbent party -0.0963** 0.0207  
(-2.54) (0.39) 
N 214 213 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis  
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for national policies). Regressions 
include the full set of individual variables as controls (not reported). Assemblée Nationale and Sénat are 
measured as dummy variables for an individual MP being member of the Assemblée or respectively the Sénat. 
The variable “S&D” is a dummy that is 1 when an individual MP is member of the S&D group and 0 when the MP 
is member of the EPP group. “Left-right scale” refers to a continuous measurement of ideology based on party 
membership of MPs drawn from Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Polk et al., 2017). The left-right scale is based on an 
interval ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 5 (center party) to 10 (extreme right). The dummy incumbent is 1 if a 
politician’s party was part of the government coalition in her country in April 2016 (in Germany: Christian 
Democrats CDU/CSU and Social Democrats; France: Parti Soicaliste, Parti radical de gauche and écologistes). 
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Table 6: EMU institutions and polices, average marginal effects for (+4), ordered probit 
model, alternative definitions of origin and ideology 
 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax policy EUI Eurobonds 
Panel (a): Baseline  
results 
         
France 0.127*** 
(4.62) 
-0.106*** 
(-2.60) 
0.0882** 
(2.09) 
0.0769**
* 
(3.02) 
0.186*** 
(6.03) 
 
Left  0.182*** 
(5.96) 
-0.492*** 
(-9.47) 
0.171*** 
(4.23) 
0.156*** 
(5.28) 
0.262*** 
(7.63) 
 
N 213 202 215 214 212 
Panel (b): Chamber split France 
 
Assemblée 0.166*** -0.105** 0.0611 0.0676** 0.174***  
(4.37) (-2.48) (1.28) (2.14) (4.66)  
         
Senat 0.115** -0.0960* 0.165** 0.136*** 0.294***  
(2.53) (-1.91) (2.35) (2.69) (5.81)     
Left 
0.179*** -0.492*** 0.179*** 0.160*** 
0.269*
** 
    
 (5.92) (-9.37) (4.43) (5.32) (7.82)     
N 213 202 215 214 212 
Panel (c): Alternative definition of EP groups      
France 0.130*** 
(4.67) 
-0.180*** 
(-3.59) 
0.0632 
(1.50) 
0.0601** 
(2.40) 
0.174*** 
(5.80) 
S&D          
 0.172*** 
(5.34) 
-0.437*** 
(-7.77) 
0.186*** 
(4.45) 
0.152*** 
(4.75) 
0.262*** 
(6.99) 
N 181 172 183 182 180 
Panel (d): Continuous definition of left-right scale 
France 0.180*** 
(5.36) 
-0.199*** 
(-4.98) 
0.123*** 
(2.73) 
0.119*** 
(4.03) 
0.237*** 
(6.87) 
Left-right scale -
0.0503*** 
(-5.43) 
0.118*** 
(12.19) 
-0.0466*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.0524 
(-5.30) 
-0.0812*** 
(-8.29) 
N 202 191 204 203 201 
Panel (e): Member of incumbent party  
France 0.134*** -0.103* 0.0799* 0.0770**
* 
0.174*** 
 (4.27) (-1.85) (1.74) (2.72) (4.78) 
Incumbent party 0.0840*** -0.0105 -0.0260 0.0472* 0.0630* 
 (3.13) (-0.19) (-0.56) (1.83) (1.93) 
N 213 202 215 214 212 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for EMU policies). Note that we 
include the full set of individual background variables as controls (not reported). Assemblée Nationale and Sénat 
are measured as dummy variables for an individual MP being member of the Assemblée Nationale or respectively 
the Sénat. The variable “S&D” is a dummy that is 1 when an individual MP is member of the S&D group and 0 
when the MP is member of the EPP group. Left-right scale refers to a continuous measurement of ideology based 
on party membership of MPs drawn from Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Polk et al., 2017). The left-right scale is 
based on an interval ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 5 (center party) to 10 (extreme right). 
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We now turn to results for different estimation procedures. First, we replace the ordered 
probit specification by an ordered logit estimation (Tables 7 and 8). All results remain 
qualitatively unchanged compared to the ordered probit specification. Second, we also apply 
a binary probit after collapsing answers from the supportive categories (+1) to (+4) into the 
outcome 1, while all other answers (rejecting and neutral positions) are coded as 0.  
Results are shown in Tables 9 and 10. The national effect loses significance for both questions 
on national growth policies. The strong impact of the ideological dimension remains robust 
for the national and EMU policy preferences of national MPs. The country dummy is significant 
only in some cases, namely for ECB purchases, EUI and Eurobonds. The sign and magnitude of 
the estimated marginal effects remain qualitatively the same. 
 
Table 7: National growth policies, average marginal effects for (+4), ordered logit model 
 
Flexible labor markets Higher investment    
France 
0.00205 
(0.08) 
-0.287*** 
0.0862* 
(1.78) 
0.229*** 
 
Left  
 
(-6.28) (4.85) 
N 214 213 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis  
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for national policies). Note that we 
include the full set of individual background variables as controls (not reported). 
 
Table 8: EMU institutions and policies, average marginal effects for (+4), ordered logit model 
 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
compact 
Tax policy EUI Eurobonds 
   
       
France 0.129*** -0.103** 0.0829** 0.0683*** 0.177***  
(4.67) (-2.57) (2.01) (2.77) (5.79)     
Left   
0.176*** 
 
-0.486*** 
 
0.168*** 
 
0.144*** 
 
0.251*** 
 
 
(5.70) (-9.27) (4.23) (4.93) (7.22)     
N 213 202 215 214 212 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis   
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for EMU policies). Note that we 
include the full set of individual background variables as controls (not reported). 
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Table 9: Support for national growth policy priorities, binary probit model 
 
Flexible labor markets Higher investment    
France 0.0144 0.0536  
(0.27) (1.20) 
   
Left -0.659*** 0.156*** 
 (-12.38) (3.07) 
   
N 214 197 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis   
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for national policies).  Full set of 
individual variables as controls are included in the regression but not reported. 
 
Table 10: Support for EMU institutions and policies, binary probit models 
 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
compact 
Tax policy EUI Eurobonds 
   
       
France 0.297*** -0.0563 0.0458 0.118* 0.295***  
(4.81) (-0.98) (0.68) (1.78) (5.24)  
         
Left 0.403*** -0.436*** 0.223*** 0.410*** 0.545*** 
 (6.64) (-8.69) (3.31) (6.50) (10.06) 
      
N 213 202 215 214 212 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; standard errors are reported in parenthesis   
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for EMU policies). Full set of 
individual variables as controls are included in the regression but not reported. 
 
Third, we consider a possible bias in our estimates from the voluntary nature of participating 
in our survey, namely sample selection bias in the spirit of Heckman (1979). While we control 
for individual background characteristics in our baseline specification to avoid possible 
omitted variable bias, the same characteristics may drive individual participation in our survey 
(see Section 2.1). In this case our sample with MPs who actually answered was not 
representative for the total population of national MPs in both countries. In order to account 
for selected samples we adopt a two-step Heckman selection procedure, in which we 
instrument for participation with information on individual membership in committees 
(economics, finance, EU affairs). Then we proceed with a binary probit model (conditional on 
participation) and re-estimate the average marginal effects on our two factors of interest, 
nationality and ideology. Table A1.5 in the Online-Appendix illustrates the effects from the 
Heckman procedure. Accounting for sample selection - based on observable MP background 
characteristics – we find effects of similar magnitude, sign and statistical significance across 
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all our survey questions. Moreover, we even find similar results if we do not control for 
individual background characteristics (see Table A1.3 and Table A1.4 in the Appendix).  
In summary, we find robust evidence on the statistical significance of left-leaning ideology as 
well as national interests as factors for the preferred design of the EMU. The magnitude of the 
average marginal effects consistently yield that ideology matters more than nationality. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Overall our results indicate that ideological differences between members of national 
parliaments concerning the future of Europe and the Eurozone are quantitatively more 
important and more robust than national differences between the French and the Germans. 
This is familiar from left-right controversies within countries (Wendler, 2016). Hence, our elite 
survey of national MPs contributes to recent evidence that European heterogeneity in cultural 
beliefs and values may be an impediment to significant reforms for the Union (Alesina et al., 
2017; Guiso et al., 2016). Our study shows that political values and ideology do represent 
significant drivers of individual MPs’ elicited preferences on EMU and national reforms. 
However, for EMU-related policies and reform options we find a strong and robust difference 
between parliamentarians of both countries even if they belong to the same party family. 
Individual characteristics of members of parliament play a minor role. Significant differences 
between German and French politicians are found in key areas concerning the future of the 
euro zone: the desirability of a strong ECB role, mutual guarantees through Eurobonds and 
fiscal constraints like those of the Fiscal Compact. Distinct national differences – beyond those 
explained by ideological differences – are much less pronounced when it comes to national 
growth increasing policies. When in the same political camp, Germans and French MPs do not 
hold very different views in this regard. Moreover, among the EMU reform issues country 
polarization is less pronounced for a reform of decision making at the European level on tax 
matters and for the introduction of a European unemployment insurance. 
Our results suggest that institutional reforms relating to economic policies in the Euro area 
may be backed by national parliaments when in both France and Germany the majorities in 
parliament share the same ideological position. However, even accounting for ideological 
differences, a “Rhine-divide” prevails in fiscal and monetary issues of the EMU.  
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Online-Appendix 
Appendix A1: Additional tables 
Table A1.1:  
Allocation of national parties and parliamentary groups to European parliament groups 
Party Country Chamber National fractional 
group 
European Parliament 
group (EP group) 
     
CDU/CSU Germany Bundestag CDU/CSU EPP 
Grüne Germany Bundestag Grüne Greens/EFA 
Die Linke Germany Bundestag Die Linke GUE/NGL 
SPD Germany Bundestag SPD S&D 
     
LR, UDI France Assemblée LR EPP 
PS, MRC, DVG France Assemblée PS S&D 
PRG, DVG France Assemblée RRDP S&D 
UDI  France Assemblée UDI ALDE 
EELV France  Assemblée Écologiste Greens/EFA 
     
LR France Senate LR EPP 
PS France  Senate PS S&D 
PRG France Senate  RDSE S&D 
UDI, AC, MoDem France Senate UDI ALDE 
EELV, DVG France Senate Écologiste Greens/EFA 
     
Note:  The national parties refer to CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), CSU (Christian Social Union in 
Bavaria), Grüne (Alliance 90/ the Greens), Die Linke (The Left), SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), LR (The 
Republicans), UDI (Union of Democrats and Independents), PS (Socialist Party), MRC (Citizen and Republican 
Movement), DVG (Miscellaneous left), PRG (Radical Party of the Left), EELV (Europe Ecology – The Greens), AC 
(Centrist Alliance), MoDem (Democratic Movement), EELV (Europe Ecology – The Greens). Additionally, RRDP 
(Radical, Republican, Democratic and Progressive) and RDSE (European Democratic and Social Rally group) 
national fractions of parliaments. EP groups are referred to in Table 1. 
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Table A1.2: Summary statistics of individual controls and alternative party definitions 
 
N   Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
   
    
France 232 0.565 0.497 0 1  
Left  231 0.580 0.495 0 1  
Female 232 0.272 0.446 0 1  
Age 232 58.871 10.091 33 81  
Years as MP 232 9.030 7.295 1 40  
Upper secondary 222 0.883 0.322 0 1  
University degree 220 0.823 0.383 0 1  
Economics committee 232 0.078 0.268 0 1  
Finance committee 232 0.147 0.354 0 1  
EU affairs committee 232 0.116 0.321 0 1  
 
 
      
Assemblée 232 0.336 9.473 0 1  
Sénat 232 0.228 0.421 0 1  
S&D 198 0.556   0.498 0 1  
Left-right scale 219 4.924 1.832 1.231 7.667  
Incumbent party 231 0.654 0.477 0 1  
       
 
 
Table A1.3: National growth policy priorities, average marginal effect for (+4) for ordered 
probit without individual characteristics controls 
 
Flexible labor markets Higher investment    
France 0.0192 
(0.79) 
0.131*** 
(2.90) 
 
 
  
Left  -0.313*** 
(-7.09) 
0.206*** 
(4.61) 
 
   
N 226 225 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for national policies). 
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Table A1.4: EMU institutions and policies priorities, average marginal effect for (+4) for 
ordered probit without individual characteristics controls 
 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax policy EUI Eurobonds 
   
       
France 0.143*** 
(5.38) 
-0.0978*** 
(-2.58) 
0.132*** 
(3.39) 
0.0857*** 
(3.65) 
0.188*** 
(6.46) 
 
 
         
Left  0.176*** 
(6.15) 
-0.482*** 
(-9.86) 
0.167*** 
(4.29) 
0.153*** 
(5.45) 
0.259*** 
(7.82) 
 
   
       
N 225 214 227 226 224 
* p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for EMU policies). 
 
Table A1.5: Bivariate probit model with sample selection 
 
 Flexible 
labor 
markets 
Higher 
invest-
ment 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax 
policy 
EUI Eurobonds 
France 0.060 
(0.083) 
0.038 
(0.042) 
0.355 *** 
(0.073) 
-0.043 
(0.056) 
0.069 
(0.080) 
0.133* 
(0.075) 
0.446*** 
(0.083) 
        
Left -0.693*** 
(0.0582) 
0.149** 
(0.059) 
0.448*** 
(0.070) 
-0.443*** 
(0.052) 
0.242*** 
(0.072) 
0.424*** 
(0.065) 
0.654*** 
(0.064) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1,  ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Note: Marginal effects are calculated for policy support, meaning positive answer categories based on the 
conditional (on selection) predicted probability of responding. Excluded instruments are the individual 
membership in Economics, Finance and EU affairs committees of the respective MP. 
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Appendix A2: Baseline estimates with all categories 
Table A2.1: Flexible labor markets, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Left 0.28*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.30*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as 
MP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper 
secondary 0.10* 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.02* -0.02 -0.10 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
University 
degree -0.15* -0.02** -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03* 0.09** 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Economics 
committee 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Finance 
committee -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
EU affairs 
committee -0.11*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.03*** 0.03** 0.12** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
          
N 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.2: Higher investment, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.08 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
Left -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.05*** 0.23*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Female 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.04** -0.02 -0.11** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as 
MP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper 
secondary -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.12) 
University 
degree -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) 
Economics 
committee 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) 
Finance 
committee -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01* -0.03** -0.04* -0.06* 0.00 0.15* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) 
EU affairs 
committee -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.04 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) 
          
N 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.3: ECB asset purchase, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.01* 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Left  -0.16*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.05** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 -0.03** -0.03** -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as 
MP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper 
secondary -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
University 
degree -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Economics 
committee -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
Finance 
committee 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
EU affairs 
committee 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
          
N 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.4: Fiscal compact, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France 0.04** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 -0.01** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
Left  0.10*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.49*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
Female -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as MP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper secondary -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) 
University degree 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) 
Economics committee -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.09 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
Finance committee -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.08 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 
EU affairs committee -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.08 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
          
N 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.5: Tax policy, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France -0.07** -0.02* -0.01* -0.00 -0.00* -0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Left  -0.14*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 0.02* 
0.04**
* 0.17*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as 
MP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper 
secondary 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) 
University 
degree -0.15 -0.03* -0.02** -0.01* -0.01** -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.14** 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
Economics 
committee -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) 
Finance 
committee -0.07** -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02** 0.12* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
EU affairs 
committee -0.08** -0.03* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02** 0.15* 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
          
N  215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.6: European unemployment insurance, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France -0.11*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.00* -0.00 0.01* 0.04*** 0.03** 0.08*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Left  -0.30*** 
-
0.06*** 
-
0.05*** -0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Female 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as MP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper 
secondary 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
University 
degree -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) 
Economics 
committee 0.13 0.02* 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03* -0.06** 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Finance 
committee -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
EU affairs 
committee 0.10 0.02* 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05* 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
          
N 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.7: Eurobonds, ordered probit, all response categories 
 (-4) (-3) (-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
France -0.18*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01** 0.03** 0.07*** 0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Left -0.33*** 
-
0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.00 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.09** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 -0.01* -0.03** -0.08*** 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years as 
MP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Upper 
secondary -0.15* -0.02* -0.01** -0.01** -0.01*** 0.00 0.03 0.05* 0.11** 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
University 
degree 0.09** 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.13* 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) 
Economics 
committee -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) 
Finance 
committee -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
EU affairs 
committee 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07* 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
          
N 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 
 
 
Appendix B Non-parametric tests of group equality 
Table B1: Chi-square tests (p-values) 
 Flexible labor 
markets 
Higher 
investment 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax 
policy 
EUI Eurobonds 
France 0.721 0.421 <0.01 <0.05 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
        
Left <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
 
Table B2: Wilcoxon-rank sum test (p-values) 
(a) Nationality - French/German 
 Flexible 
labor 
markets 
Higher 
investment 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax 
policy 
EUI Eurobonds 
Rank-
sum test 
0.3585 <0.05 <0.01 <0.10 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
        
Median 
test 
0.380  <0.10 <0.01 <0.10 <0.05 0.120 <0.01 
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(b) Ideology - Left/Conservative 
 Flexible 
labor 
markets 
Higher 
investment 
ECB asset 
purchase  
Fiscal 
Compact 
Tax 
policy 
EUI Eurobonds 
Rank-
sum test 
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
        
Median 
test 
<0.01 <0.05 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
 
 
